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THE SACRED COW OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE
PROBLEMS OF DEADLOCK AND
DISSOLUTION
CAXIoS L. IsRAELs*
0RAOmN ... is a mere conception of the legislative mind. It
4 exists only on paper through the command of the legislature that
L . its mental conception shall be clothed with power"-thus, a fa-
mous Judge of the New York Court of Appeals in 1912.1 Among the pow-
ers with which the corporation is thus clothed is the power to survive the
death of its owners or any one or more of them. Indeed, under most stat-
utes corporate existence is permitted to be perpetual and the vast majori-
ty of certificates filed under those statutes so provide. By the same token
destruction of the legislative creature is not easy. Historically the courts
have been reluctant to destroy it except under conditions expressly spelled
out by the legislature as warranting such action; and even under such con-
ditions the courts are wont to speak of dissolution as a "drastic" remedy
and to seek almost any other available alternative before resorting to it.
It is the writer's view that this sacred cow has all too often been an ef-
fective road block in cases where the over-all best interests of the owners
of the enterprise call for its dissolution or liquidation. Such situations most
commonly arise in what we have come to call "dose corporations." By
that term, we do not necessarily imply that the enterprise is a small one
-- or that the number of its shareholders is relatively few, although the
latter, at least, is usually the case. What we do mean, is a corporation
where management and ownership are substantially identical to the ex-
tent that the independent judgment of directors is, in fact, a fiction.2 We
mean the corporate entity typically organized by an individual, or a group
of individuals, seeking the recognized advantages of incorporation, limited
liability, perpetual existence and easy transferability of interests-but re-
garding themselves basically as partners and seeking veto powers as
* Member of the New York Bar.
1 Vann, J. in People v. Knapp, 201 N.Y. 373, 381, 99 N.E. 841, 844 (1912).
2 The Validity of Stockholders' Voting Agreements in Illinois, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 640,
647 (1936). A similar definition was adopted by the New York State Law Revision Com-
mission, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 K (1948) pp. 3 89 et seq.
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among themselves much more akin to the partnership relation than to the
statutory scheme of representative corporate government.3
The first result of the search for veto powers is to circumscribe easy
transferability of interests. A partnership status is not assignable but,
* theoretically, the shareholder in a close corporation can sell his shares, sub-
ject, of course, to the impediment that the realization of anything like fair
value for them is often stultified by lack of any real market. The members
of a partnership have complete personal veto power over the admission of
a new partner. The participants in close corporations seek the same result
through cross option agreements on their shareholdings. The analogy is not
complete because the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation
limits them to the cross option device and thus denies the full and com-
plete veto which the participants each would like to wield.4
The individuals seek job security for long and even indefinite periods.
They agree to vote annually for each other's election as directors, and con-
tract in advance that, as directors, they will vote to employ themselves in
stated capacities and at stated salaries or at salaries bearing consistent re-
lations to each other. With the trend of increasing income taxation and
the return of the excess profits tax the tendency has been to make those
salaries as high as the traffic will bear or as the Bureau of Internal Revenue
will allow in order to minimize the total tax cost of doing business.
Despite the theory that the function of directors is to direct and not
merely to carry out the contractual arrangements of those who elected
them, the individuals seek personal veto powers over matters which
legally are the function of the board. They seek those powers either
frankly in those terms or through charter or by-law provisions requiring
unanimity or qualified majority action by directors or shareholders or
both, carefully safeguarding such provisions against amendment by less
than the qualified majority.
No one doubts the ability of partners to agree that certain of their num-
ber shall be managing partners, that decisions on matters of business poli-
cy shall be taken by the managing partners alone, by all the partners or
by a qualified majority. The participants in close corporations merely seek
8See generally, Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 Cornell L.Q. 488 (1948);
Delaney, The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be Tied in Advance, 50 Col. L. Rev. 52
(1950).
4See generally 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (perm. ed., 1931) §§ 5453, 5456;
Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y. Supp. 873 (Sup. Ct., 1919); People v.
Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924); Restrictions on Sale of Corporate Stock, 2 A.L.R. 2d 745
(1948); O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations; Planning
and Drafting, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773 (1952).
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to adapt the corporate form to reach similar results, but when they do the
courts of several states have held that such agreements fly in the face of
statutes providing that "the business of the corporation shall be managed
by its board of directors." 5
The Courts of New York, New Jersey and Virginia, for example, have
struck down shareholder agreements requiring unanimity or qualified
majority for directorial action.6 New York relaxes the severity of the rule
when the question is one of job security and the individual is on good be-
havior.7
The Illinois Courts showed more flexibility. They by-passed the ques-
tion of compliance with the statutory scheme, and specifically enforced the
agreement of the individuals, though the results were that the board of di-
rectors was in fact deprived of some of its theoretical discretion.8 With the
adoption of the Business Corporation Act in 1933 the situation in Illinois
was clarified. By specific provision of that Act charter provisions requiring
qualified majority for shareholder action, and by-law provisions requiring
it for directors' action are permitted.'
Four years ago New York sought to bring itself in line with Illinois.
The Court of Appeals had decided four to three that an agreement be-
tween a 60% and a 40% shareholder of a close corporation that unanimous
action should be required by the directors and by shareholders on all issues
was unenforcible and void except so far as it forbade amendment of the
by-laws by less than unanimous consent.'0 On the recommendation of the
Law Revision Commission the legislature added Section 9 to the Stock
Corporation Law. This section specifically permits charter requirements
of unanimity or qualified majority for stockholders' or directors' action
either in general or on specified issues." Its provisions have been much
availed of.
5 Most of the statutes use this or similar language. See Parker, Corporation Manual (pub-
lished annually) passim.
6 Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829 (1945); Jackson v.
Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 AtI. 568 (1910); Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E. 2d 893
(1944). "To ask that directors be divested of all power and that without the consent of every
stockholder no one should have power to do anything is to ask too much." Kaplan v. Block,
ibid., at 337, 897.
7 See, e.g., Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
8 Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589, 73 N.E. 874 (1905); Fitzgerald v. Christie, 242 Ill.
App. 343 (1926). Cf. Specific Enforcement of Shareholder Voting Agreements, 15 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 738 (1948).
9 Ill. Bus. Corp. Act (1951) §§ 37, 146.
10 Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829 (1945).
11 N.Y. Stock Corp. Law (McKinney, 1943) § 9 added by N.Y.L. (1948) c. 862, § 1, amended
by N.Y.L. (1949) c. 261 and N.Y.L. (1951) c. 717, § 1.
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Thus the trend has been and will, I think, continue by statute or by
decision to permit the participants in close corporations in one way or an-
other to preserve the type of veto powers over the administration of the
corporate enterprise which partners commonly contract for. But partner-
ship continues either for a specific agreed period or at will. Thus, time at
least provides a remedy if a falling out occurs, and dissolution or winding
up or both will break the impasse. On this analogy the New York statute
originally provided that charter requirements of unanimity or qualified
majority should be valid for a maximum period of ten years, after which
they could be renewed for one or more similar periods. However, by
amendment in 1951 the limitation was eliminated, and thus we have in
most states of the Union the problem of dealing with a set-up originally
based on mutual confidence and good will which is no longer present, em-
bodied in what amounts to a contractual arrangement in perpetuity.
If I am right about the trend, we shall have not only more deadlock
cases, but more cases of stalemate-the consistent non-cooperation, with
or without moral justification, of one or more individuals-which can
seriously harm the enterprise and the interests of the majority. The pow-
ers of our courts derived from statutes or precedents have, I think, often
proven inadequate to deal with the strict deadlock cases largely because
the sacred cow of corporate existence blocks the road. A fortiori in the
stalemate cases where, unless we carry our legal thinking forward with the
trend, we may well find that perpetual existence for some close corpora-
tions has turned from an advantage to a detriment.
The courts of many states have held they have no power-absent stat-
ute-to dissolve or wind up the affairs of a corporation. The statutory
pattern universally permits dissolution at the suit of the state-for non-
payment of taxes or like cause. In most states this is supplemented by
provisions for "voluntary" dissolution pursuant to corporate act by the
directors 2 or by shareholder action, sometimes by qualified, e.g., two-
thirds majority.13 In a lesser number of states there are "involuntary"
dissolution statutes, permitting suit by the holders of varying percentages
of the outstanding shares from fifty percent 4 down to a single share-
holder. 5 Cases of the type that interest us here arise under the in-
2 Michigan and New York.
12 Parker, Corporation Manual, passim.
14 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.2354; N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law (McKinney, 1943) § 103,
amended by N.Y.L. (1944) c. 176; Ohio Code Ann. (rev. ed., 1948) §§ 8623-86.
"5 Ill. Bus. Corp. Act (1951) § 86; Minn. Stat. (1949) § 301.50.
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voluntary dissolution statutes, many of which are aimed in specific terms
at the deadlock situation.16
However as one might expect, many of these statutes have been strictly
construed. The leading, and much quoted Illinois case of Wheeler v. Pull-
man Iron & Steel Co., 7 first affirms that absent statute the courts have no
power to dissolve; then construes the Illinois statute in force at the time,
which permitted dissolution only "for good cause shown" as requiring
"legal cause-a cause for which the sovereign authority might by law, re-
sume the franchise granted." 8 Later Illinois decisions held that while an
ultra vires act would constitute "good cause" 9 the deadlock situation was
not covered.20
Where the statute is specifically aimed at deadlock the case is not so
difficult. But here also, strict construction, consistent with the untouch-
ability of the sacred cow, has been the history. Many of the deadlock pro-
visions are modeled on the New York statute as it stood from 1929 to
1944.
If a corporation has an even number of directors who are equally divided respecting
the management of its affairs, the holders of one-half of the stock entitled to vote at an
election of directors may present a verified petition for dissolution of the corporation
as prescribed in this article.2"
By its plain terms the statute seems to permit a stockholder petition only
if the corporation has a deadlocked board of directors, and such was its
construction. Early cases under it dismissed the petition when the certifi-
cate or by-laws called for an uneven number of directors.22 It took the
New York Courts ten years to reach the conclusion that "an even number
of directors who are equally divided" is just as effectively created by the
resignation or refusal to function of the odd director as by the provisions
of the certificate or a by-law."
The courts of other states have not been even so imaginative. New Jer-
16 There is an excellent analytical and comparative study of the deadlock statutes as they
stood in 1944 by the New York Law Revision Commission. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 K (1944)
pp. 348 et seq. For today's texts see Parker, Corporation Manual, passim.
1 143 I1. 197,32 N.E. 420 (1892).
28 Ibid., at 207, 422.
19 Bixler v. Summerfield, 195 Ill. 147, 62 N.E. 849 (1902).
2D Gidwitz v. Cohen, 238 Ill. App. 227 (1925).
2N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law (McKinney, 1943) § 103, as it stood prior to its amendment by
N.Y.L. (1944) c. 176, § 2.
22 E.g., In re Fehrenbach, 155 Misc. 663, 281 N.Y. Supp. 149 (1935).
23 Matter of Binder (Rednib Realty Corp.) 258 App. Div. 1041, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 1020 (1st
Dep't, 1939).
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sey requires that the corporation have "an even number of directors who
are equally divided respecting the management of its affairs, and that the
voting shares of such corporation are equally divided into two independent
ownerships or interests" and that the shareholders be "unable to agree on,
or vote for, the election of a board of directors consisting of an uneven
number .... "24
Under this provision the law of New Jersey still may be that if the by-
laws call for five directors, but there are only four in office and neither they
nor the shareholders can agree upon a fifth, the case must be thrown out.25
The deadlock provision of Model Corporation Act (drafted by the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws) is similar in form to the New Jersey
statute.
28
Other statutes, while defining deadlock more broadly, set up varying
additional requirements or standards. In New York today one can con-
tract against the applicability of the deadlock section because it begins
with the words "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorpora-
tion. .... -21 Another section applicable to all proceedings for dissolution
requires the decreeing court to find "that a dissolution will be beneficial
to the stockholders or members and not injurious to the public."2 8
5 The latest and now leadingNewYork case, Application of Cantelmo,29 in-
volved a corporation which had been started by the plaintiff and defend-
ant with a capital of $3000. At the time of the suit it was making large
profits and they were drawing $25,000 apiece with bonuses. They could
not agree upon a third director. The Appellate Division refused dissolu-
tion, finding that the plaintiff had brought about the deadlock to force the
defendant out and get control for himself. Speaking for the majority of the
court, justice Shientag wrote, "We see no reason why the courts should,
under the circumstances here presented, lend themselves to the accom-
plishment of the purpose sought by the petitioner." 30 The majority hung
its hat on the requirement that the Court must find the dissolution "bene-
ficial to the stockholders." 3' "[This]" said Justice Shientag, "is intended
'4 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) Title 14, § 13-1.1 (emphasis added).
2 Dorf v. Hill Bus Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A. 2d 761 (1947); but cf. the Chancellor's
statement in the same case that he has general equity power to dissolve, 54 A. 2d 761, 763.
2Model Business Corporation Act § 51, adopted in Louisiana, L. 1928, Act 250, § 55;
and in Washington, Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1940) § 3803-50.
" N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law (McKinney, 1943) § 103, amended by N.Y.L. (1944) c. 276, § 2.
28 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law (McKinney, 1943) § 117.
9 88 N.Y.S. 2d 604 (1st Dep't, 1949), noted in 50 Col. L. Rev. 100 (1950).
o Ibid., at 606. ,, N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law (McKinney, 1943) § 117.
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to mean something, and it applies with peculiar force to the situation here
involved." 32 Justice Cohn dissented, pointing out, among other things,
that in the course of negotiations preliminary to the suit, counsel for the
defendant had threatened an application for dissolution under the dead-
lock statute; that if the business were sold either party would have an
equal opportunity to buy it.33 Since this decision the New York Courts re-
quire the plaintiff in a deadlock case first to establish his own good faith
before his petition will be considered.3 4 Shades of requirin that plaintiff
plead and prove freedom from contributory negligence! "
Indiana, Missouri and Pennsylvania require a showing that "irrepa-
rable injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason
of the deadlock." From 1933 to 1951, the Illinois provision was the same.15
The only reported Illinois case decided under this provision still indicates
strict construction. The plaintiff, 50% shareholder, sued the other 50%
shareholder for forming another corporation to exploit trade-marks owned
by the first corporation. The defendant counterclaimed for dissolution,
alleging deadlock. The court thought that the defendant had tried to
wrest control from the plaintiff; that the acts of the plaintiff were not "op-
pressive or fraudulent"3 and that the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish that "irreparable injury would result to the corporation from the
deadlock." It dismissed the counterclaim.37
Outside of the important commercial states of New York and Illinois
the courts have found less difficulty. Those of Pennsylvania and Mis-
souri have construed the phrase "irreparable injury to the corpora-
tion" as encompassing not only the "legal personality" of the enterprise,
but the real interests of its owners. Said the Missouri Supreme Court in a
recent case in which two brothers were unable to agree upon their policies
and operations:
We think [dissolution] is a better remedy than for courts to undertake to run the affairs
of corporations over long indefinite periods.... It would certainly be most unfair to
do this... wholly at the expense of defendant.38
3" Application of Cantelmo, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 604, 606 (1st Dep't, 1949).
3 Ibid., at 607.
34 Petition of Adler, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 383 (1st Dep't, 1950).
"Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) § 25-242(6); Mo. L. (1943) § 88; Pa. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 1107; Ill. Bus. Corp. Act (1951) § 86(a)(1).
3"Ill. Bus. Corp. Act (1951) § 86(a)(2).
37 Lush'us Distributors v. Ft. Dearborn Lith. Co., 330 Ill. App. 216, 70 N.E. 2d 737 (1946).
3S Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 1166, 232 S.W. 2d 944,951 (1950); see also Bowman
v. Gum, Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 184 Ati. 258 (1936); Garrett v. George K. Garrett Co., 39 D. & C.
(Pa.) 179 (1940).
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Obviously such thinking is a clear reflection of the classic (and proper)
reluctance of the courts to "put themselves in business." The result is still
easier to reach under statutes such as those of California and Minnesota,
which merely require the finding
that there is internal dissension and that two or more factions of the shareholders of
the corporation are so deadlocked that its business cannot longer be conducted with
advantage to its shareholders.A9
Thus the Minnesota Court in its most recent opinion decreed dissolu-
tion because
[it clearly appears from the respective petitions that the bitterness between the two
factions has reached a point where, regardless of the fact that a suggestion by one of
them may be for the benefit of the corporation, the other will vote against it.4
It has been suggested that the courts' reluctance to dissolve varies in
inverse ratio to the prosperity of the enterprise; that where the faction
which happens to be in office at the date of the resignation, death or other
incident which caused the deadlock is continuing to manage the company
successfully, it is necessary in addition to prove some measure of exploita-
tion of the minority.4' In the writer's view the cases do not bear this out.
The New Jersey courts, for instance, have recently dissolved two sub-
stantially sized and prosperous deadlocked corporations, holding that
(given an even-numbered board) the very fact of deadlock creates corpo-
rate "paralysis" and requires dissolution. In one of these cases, the dispute
was between the preferred and common stockholders, each class repre-
sented by two directors, over the wisdom of paying preferred dividendsfor
which earnings were dearly sufficient. The court drove off the sacredcow:
[Wihere as here, corporate function can no longer be had due to irreconcilable differ-
ences between two independent classes of stockholders of equal voting power, the
corporation is subject to dissolution in the interest of the public and the shareholders who
may suffer injury.... A Corporation does not have an absolute right to existence in
perpetuity... under the management of one who happened to be serving in that
capacity when the deadlock occurred.42
The second case, involving the affairs of Jersey City's leading news-
paper, the Jersey Journal, ended, after decree, with a buy-out of one fac-
39 Minn. Stat. (1949) § 301.49(4); Calif. Corp. Code (Deering, 1948) § 4651(d). The Cali-
fornia statute has one unique feature: Where the stockholders are unable to agree upon an
odd director, the court can appoint one. Ibid., at § 4655.
401n re Hedberg-Friedheim & Co., 233 Minn. 534, 538, 47 N.W. 2d 424,427 (1951).
41 See, e.g., Deadlock as Ground for Dissolution under New York Corporation Law, 50
Col. L. Rev. 100 (1950).
42Petition of Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 389, 70 A. 2d 159, 163 (1949), annotated in
13 A.L.R. 2d 1250 (1949) (emphasis added). Accord: R.K.O. Theatres v. Trenton-New Bruns.
Theatres Co., 8 N.J. Super. 404, 72 A. 2d 14 (1950).
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tion by the other only a few months ago.43 In contrast, the New York
court's resort to a sort of "clean-hands" doctrine in the Cantelmo case
against a background of prosperity lends color to the argument that pros-
perity of the enterprise under its holdover management is a factor, but
most of the other cases which appear in point involved marital difficul-
ties. 44
A 1951 amendment to the Illinois Business Corporation Act lays down
the dearest pragmatic statutory standard for deadlock or stalemate as a
ground for dissolution. Section 86(a) (2) now provides
(2) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed, for a
period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors
to directors whose term has expired or would have expired upon the election of their
successors.4"
The statute is, of course, too new yet to have met construction. It is to
be hoped that the courts construing it will avoid the "clean-hands" pitfall,
and, if they see a choice between the reasoning of the New York and the
New Jersey courts on that point, follow the latter.
46
As will be obvious from the foregoing discussion, there will be difficulty
in applying many of the deadlock statutes to the stalemate case. Many
are drawn for deadlock only', referring to "equal" division into "two" fac-
tions,47 or requiring that the holders of fifty percent of the shares file the
petition. 48 Others would be easily applied?" A third group would be ap-
plicable only if the interest petitioning for dissolution were large enough,
though less than fifty percent, to meet the statutory minimum.50 In the
latter group are the statutes of the Carolinas and of West Virginia. They
are worth special mention because they permit a petition based, not upon
deadlock or stalemate as such, but upon a ground which will often exist in
43 In re Evening Journal Ass'n, 1 N.J. 437, 64 A. 2d 80 (1949), 15 N.J. Sup. 58, 83 A. 2d 38
(1951); the fact of the sale was reported in 58 Time, No. 22, at 60 (Nov. 26, 1951).
44 E.g., Valerie Bland v. Lee C. Bland Corp., 16 Conn. Supp. 268 (Super. Ct., 1949);
Application of George W. Anderson, Inc. 104 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (S. Ct:, 1951).
5Ill. Bus. Corp. Act (1951) § 86(a)(2).
46 Lush'us Distributors, Inc. v. Ft. Dearborn Lith. Co., 332 I1. App. 216, 70 N.E. 2d 737
(1946), points up the danger. The New Jersey court in In Re Evening Journal Association,
specifically rejected the rationale of the Cantelmo case. For a suggestion as to how a case of
clear bad faith on plaintiff'spart may perhaps be intelligently dealt with, see infra p. 788
et seq.
47 E.g., New Jersey, note 24 supra.
48 E.g., Michigan, New York, Ohio, note 14 supra.
49 E.g., Ill., Minn., note 15 supra.
60 Massachusetts permits a petition by the holders of 40% of the shares, Ann. Laws Mass.
(1948) c. 155, § 50; California by one-third, Calif. Corp. Code (Deering, 1948) § 4650(b).
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such a case-namely failure to pay dividends for a specified period. The
Carolinas5 ' permit a petition by the holders of one-fifth or more of the
shares alleging (a) that earnings have been insufficient to pay dividends
on the paid-up stock for the preceding three years; or (b) that no divi-
dends have been paid at all for the preceding five or six years. Where no
dividends have been paid on common stock for ten years or more, the
holders of 10% of the outstanding paid-up common may petition. How-
ever, there are no reported deadlock or stalemate cases under these stat-
utes, and the decisions emphasize the discretionary power of the courts to
deny relief in times of stress, either in the general economy or in the par-
ticular company's affairs.12 West Virginia permits the holders of 25% or
more to file, alleging failure to pay dividends for two years, whereupon the
court may "if sufficient cause be shown" dissolve the corporation.53 In a
series of cases which do not appear to have involved genuine deadlock or
stalemate the courts equated "sufficient cause" to "possible insolvency
due to mismanagement and diverting of funds of the company."5 4 Con-
fronted in 1950 with a clear deadlock case, the West Virginia Supreme
Court failed to see the difference. It first dismissed the bill for lack of spe-
cific allegations of mismanagement;55 and sustained it only after it was
amended to allege misappropriation of $2500 of corporate fund% the in-
crease of defendant's salary at meetings of which plaintiff had received no
notice, and the like.55 It seems to the writer that the first decision was
wrong, particularly in the light of the revision of the statute in 1929 to in-
clude a provision permitting the defendants to avoid dissolution by pur-
chasing the plaintiff's stock at an appraised value set by the court.57
So much for the statutory gamut. Apart from statute there has been
progress also. Thus several courts have held that they have general equity
power to dissolve a corporation. As early as 1908 the courts of Washington
had held that lacking general equity power to dissolve, they had such
power to liquidate or wind up the corporate business and thus reach the
51 Gen. Stat. N.C. (1950) § 55-125; S.C. Code (1942) § 7725.
62 Kistler v. Cotton Mills Co., 205 N.C. 809, 172 S.E. 373 (1934); Towles v. S.C. Produce
Ass'n, 187 S.C. 290, 197 S.E. 305 (1938).
5 3 W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) c. 31, § 3093.
64 Hirsch v. Independent Steel Co. of America, 196 Fed. 104 (S.D.W.Va., 1911). Accord:
Stevens v. Empire Casualty Co., 180 Fed. 283 (N.D.W.Va., 1910); Robinson v. Company,
110 W.Va. 143, 157 S.E. 85 (1931); cf. Williams v. Notion Co., 82 W.Va. 549, 96 S.E. 929
(1918) which clearly involved "corporate paralysis" if not deadlock, and sustained the bill.
T Hall v. McLuckey, Inc., 60 S.E. 2d 280 (W. Va., 1950).
5 8Hall v. McLuckey, Inc., 65 S.E. 2d 494 (W. Va., 1951).
11 California has a similar provision, Corp. Code (Deering, 1948) §§ 4658-59.
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same result.58 The reasoning is spelled out in a leading Kansas case59 and
carried to its logical conclusion by the Supreme Court of Alabama."
In other states, courts meeting the question for the first time have de-
cided it in favor of an inherent or general equity power to dissolve, and
a few have overruled earlier decisions to the contrary.6' Some courts have
reached such decisions where there was no statute.6 2 Others have reached
it by holding the statutory remedy to be nonexclusive. Interestingly
enough, two leading cases in the latter category afforded the preferred
stockholders of public issue corporations relief against the refusal of direc-
torates controlled by common shareholders to pay out preferred divi-
dends. 3
The fact that in New York and in Michigan directors alone can file for
dissolution without shareholder approval has led the courts of those states
to require the directors so to file in cases where the facts showed both re-
curring losses and abuse of managerial prerogatives. Thus where, despite
a long record of losses, the principal officer and member of the majority
group received a substantial and patently unjustified increase in salary, a
New York court, at the petition of a minority stockholder, ordered the di-
rectors to apply for dissolution, observing that "bad faith and fraud in re-
fraining from dissolving a corporation may be shown to be as much a
breach of duty, as bad faith and fraud in seeking wrongfully to dissolve
[it]." 64 Michigan cases use similar language. 5
58 State ex rel. Conlon v. Oudin & Bergman Fire Clay Mining & Mfg. Co., 48 Wash. 196,
93 Pac. 219 (1908).
59 Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kans. 95, 217 Pac. 301 (1923).
60 Cowin v. Salmon, 248 Ala. 580, 28 So. 2d 633 (1947). This also seems to be the law of
Delaware, a relatively unimportant state, perhaps, in a close corporation context; see Lichens
Co. v. Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., 28 Del. Ch. 220, 40 A. 2d 447 (1944)..
61 Flemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1933); Guaranty
Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P. 2d 975 (1948); Hammond v. Hammond, 216
S.W. 2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App., 1949). See also Dorf v. Hill Bus Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A. 2d
761 (1947); and Corporation -Dissolution at Instance of Minority Stockholder, 28 N.C. L.
Rev. 313 (1950).
12 Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P. 2d 975 (1948).
6s In re Mansfield Ry. Light and Power Co., 3 Ohio App. 253 (1914); Tower-Hill Connells-
ville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F. 2d 817 (C.A. 4th, 1933). The Mansfield case is
often cited for the propositi n that where there is internal dissension the "public interest"
might require dissolution. It is not precisely authority for that proposition. The corporation
was a public utility, a tracti n company, and the court, interested in rescuing the local pre-
ferred stockholders from the toils of holding company control, expressed concern that the dis-
sensions might interfere with "the reasonable discharge of [the corporation's] duties to the
public."
64 Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y. Supp. 387, 393 (1st Dep't, 1931); fol-
lowed in Lennan v. Blakeley, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
1 Holden v. Lashley-Cox Land Co., 316 Mich. 478, 25 N.W. 2d 590 (1947). "[The ulti-
mate object of every trading corporation is the pecuniary gain of its stockholders ... it is
DEADLOCK AND DISSOLUTION
What, then, should be the law? The writer can only express a personal
view-with some judicial support-that deadlock or stalemate in a dose
corporation is as completely socially undesirable as in partnership or in a
marriage, and that the corporate contract is not a holy sacrament. The
remedy in the partnership case is beautifully simple and over the years
courts of equity appear to have administered it satisfactorily. The Uni-
form Partnership Act draws a distinction between dissolution (the techni-
cal termination) and winding-up or liquidation of the partnership.68 In the
case of a fixed term partnership dissolution is automatic at the expiration
of the term, and winding-up ensues unless the partners, all or one or more
of them, decide to carry on. The interesting analogy lies in the fact that it
is possible for any general partner, by his express will, to bring about a
dissolution at any time regardless of the expiration of the term. The stat-
ute gives a list of causes which will justify an order of dissolution. For
example:
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as terids to affect prejudicially the
carrying on of the business,
(d) A partner wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership agree-
ment, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business
that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.67
But whether or not any of the statutory grounds exist, a general partner
may bring about dissolution. His only risk is that it will be considered
wrongful and that, as a result, he will be penalized by losing his interest in
the name and goodwill of the business to the other partners and being
liable to them for any damages that they may suffer by reason of his
action."
The point is that the dissolution takes place willy-nilly. Liquidation
may or may not follow. If the dissolution is wrongful, the remaining part-
ners have a choice. They may pay out the value of the dissolving partner's
interest less damages and his share of the value of intangibles, or post bond
for their indebtedness to him and continue without him for the balance of
for this purpose and no other that the capital has been advanced; and if circumstances have
rendered it impossible to continue to carry out the purpose for which it was formed with profit
to its stockholders, it is the duty of its managing agents to wind up its affairs." Miner v. Belle
Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97,113, 53N.W. 218, 223 (1892); cf. Tower-Hill ConnellsvilleCoke Co. v.
Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F. 2d 817 (C.A. 4th, 1933).
6 Uniform Partnership Act § 29.
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the term. So far as the reported cases indicate the practice, the remaining
partners do not usually avail themselves of the alternative of posting
bond, and where they do the liability for damages for loss of profits is
largely academic. It may be necessary to replace the services of the dis-
solving partner but unless that should involve an outlay greater than his
share of the profits would have been had he continued, we probably have
damnum absque injuria.
Once we assume the social desirability of requiring that the intimate
relationships between the participants in a deadlocked or stalemated dose
corporation be cut off, the partnership analogy is obviously apt. Before
there was a Minnesota deadlock statute, the Supreme Court of that State
wrote:
[We find no real disagreement in the adjudications ... in actions against mismanaged
co-partnerships... if the rule be sound as applied to co-partnerships, the manner and
form of the organization of corporation would seem not a sufficient reason for denying
similar relief at the suit of stockholders thereof.69
Statutory implementation should not be difficult. There are these ques-
tions: (1) Under what circumstances should petition be permitted;
(2) Who may petition; and (3) How adequate and flexible would be the
remedy?
As to the first question the writer would suggest either the present
California-Minnesota definition,70 or the 1951 Illinois amendment.7 1 The
latter has the virtue of requiring a sort of "cooling-off period, 7 2 but in
some cases two years might be too long.13 A combination of the two cri-
teria might thus be indicated, the two-year inability to elect a board cre-
ating a conclusive presumption in favor of the petition.
As to the second item, there seems no reason why the petition should
not be filed by the holder of even a single share. Granted actual deadlock
or stalemate all interests, however small, are placed in jeopardy. Illinois
and several other jurisdictions permit this under their present statutes.7 4
69 Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 70, 162 N.W. 1056,
1058 (1917).
70 Quoted, p. 785 supra.
71 See p. 786 supra.
72 Cf. the provision of the National Labor Relations Act for a statutory 90-day injunction
against strikes where public health and safety may be jeopardized, Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 at §§ 208-210, 61 Stat. 155-56 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 178-80 (Supp., 1951).
73 In several recent cases, the courts have held the parties in lerrorem decreeing that failing
agreement within a specified period, dissolution would be ordered. See, e.g., R.K.O. Theatres v.
Trenton-New Bruns. Theatres Co., 8 N.J. Super. 404,72 A. 2d 914 (1950).
74 See note 15 supra.
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As to flexibility of remedy, the courts have always been conscious of the
necessity for protecting minority interests, and even majorities where
forced sales or similar procedures are involved. The Supreme Court of
Kentucky after deciding that
to leave these warring stockholders as they were prior to the time of the appointment
of the receiver by the Circuit Court would be but to insure the wrecking of the prop-
erty
directed the lower court to
order the sale on such terms as to time as to enable either party to purchase it if
they desire and... insure such an active competition between the factions, and per-
haps others, for the property, as will insure that there will be no sacrifice of it at the
sale.75
In the writer's view the courts should have the power, as they do in
California and in West Virginia 78 to preserve the going enterprise and
solve the problem by permitting acquisition of the plaintiff's stock by the
defendants at an appraised value. To make the partnership analogy sub-
stantially complete, the courts should be empowered, in fixing such a
value, to consider plaintiff's good faith, i.e., his responsibility for the cre-
ation and continuance of the deadlock or stalemate, the degree to which,
even though responsible, his conduct may have been justified, and also to
fix terms of payment.
All this, of course, is but interesting speculation. In the meantime, there
appear to be two possible remedies, the first of limited applicability be-
cause it requires anticipation, the second possibly more widely useful. It
is clear today that there is no legal objection to the agreement between A,
B, and C, each to vote his shareholdings for the election of the others as
directors for a stated period or for so long as they all remain shareholders.
When clients urge upon their counsel that the close corporation they are
organizing should be so set up that it cannot function without their unani-
mous consent will they not perhaps agree-as partners often do-that if
for a stated time their disagreement causes corporate paralysis, e.g., in-
ability of the board to act-all will vote their shares for dissolution? During
the three-year period when the New York statute contained a ten year
limitation on the effectiveness of a charter requirement of unanimity or
qualified majority for stockholders' or directors' action, this device was
75 Graham v. McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, 684, 123 S.W. 260, 262 (1909). But Kentucky seems to
have slipped backward into the strict construction school. Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky.
522, 105 S.W. 2d 625 (1937). For another illustration of flexibility of remedy intelligently em-
ployed, see Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W. 2d 944 (1950).
76 See notes 53 and 57 supra.
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frequently resorted to to cover the contingency of nonrenewal. The writer
has found no case that questions its validity and there are two cases, one
in New York and one in Massachusetts, which not only do not question
the enforcibility of the agreement but indicate the courts' willingness to
specifically enforce it. 77
The broader suggestion may seem at first blush more radical, but I sub-
mit actually is nothing more than the old common-law process of fitting
the facts into a familiar category. Why should not a court of equity deter-
mine that the participants in a deadlocked or stalemated dose corporation
are joint venturers as between themselves?
The law as to joint venture is not too clear in many aspects. But it is
clear that the concept is not rigid; that it does not require an explicit
agreement applying the label "joint venture" to the activity or series of
activities in question; and that the closest analogy is to a partnership at
will."' From that analogy flows the power of the Chancellor to dissolve and
liquidate as in a partnership. 79 That power could be exercised in any man-
ner calculated to produce a fair result, e.g. by appraising petitioner's
stockholdings for purchase by the defendants;80 or by directing the parties
to vote their shares for dissolution of their creature, the corporate entity.,'
Such a decision would not be the first to grant to the parties in one of their
capacities relief denied to them by precedent in another. 8
2
77In re Block's Will, 186 Misc. 945, 60 N.Y.S. 2d 639 (Surr. Ct., 1946); Leventhal v.
Atlantic Finance Co., 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E. 2d 20 (1944). Flanagan v. Flanagan, 273 App.
Div. 918, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 682 (2d Dept., 1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 787, 83 N.E. 2d 473 (1948), is
cited by Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 Yale L.J.
1040 (1950), for the proposition that an agreement to dissolve in various contingencies is
invalid "because it attempted to make a 'partnership of the corporation.'" The writer does
not think this a correct interpretation because the agreement was not phrased in terms of the
stockholders voting for dissolution but in terms of requiring a distribution of corporate property
if and when the event occurred. In view of the two cases cited, the writer believes a better
drawn agreement could have produced the opposite result.
78 See generally, Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 Va. L. Rev. 425 (1950).
7' See, e.g., Null v. Parsons, 145 Ill. App. 436 (1908).
80 Cf. the California statute, note 57 supra, and that of West Virginia, note 53 supra.
81 Cf. Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't, 1931) and
Holden v. Lashley-Cox Land Co., 316 Mich. 478, 25 N.W. 2d 590 (1947).
2 Null v. Parsons, 145 Ill. App. 436 (1908), distinguished the remedy of partition which
the court seemed to think was not available, but in effect reached the same result. Cf. the
recent (unreported) decision of the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois in Leibrandt v.
Finder, No. 49 S 18333 (June 28, 1951), finding, and directing dissolution of a joint venture
as betweeen the beneficiaries of an Illinois land trust to whom, as such, partition could not
have been granted.
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Once it be granted that the participants in a close corporation should be
permitted, as between themselves, to impose personal vetoes on the pow-
ers usually vested by our corporate statutes in majorities, it seems clear
to the writer that a simple and flexible remedy for deadlock or stalemate
must be provided, and that the untouchability of the sacred cow must not
be permitted to impede its exercise. Too precise definition, too onerous re-
quirements as to who may seek relief, and too much rigidity of available
remedy will do social harm. What we need is faith in the sensitivity of the
Chancellor's foot, and to permit him, with due dignity, and in a proper
case, to apply the boot to the sacred cow of corporate existence.
